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Summary
In this paper, we defend the idea that in the African context, non-market co-operation between
farmers and ginning companies outperforms market transactions. In the absence of a reliable
legal mechanism, market liberalization threatens the sustainability of contractual agreements
between farmers and cotton companies. We present alternatives to the full market competition
option and to the public monopoly organization that allow the production contract to be
preserved. Special attention is paid to the case of Burkina Faso where efficiency gains have
been obtained thanks to the strengthening of farmers' organizations and their financial
participation in the cotton company.
Key Words: Cotton – West Africa – Contract farming – markets failure – zoning – yardstick
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1. INTRODUCTION
African cotton production has strongly increased since the 70s making the region the
second world exporter of cotton lint in 2000/01 (appendix A). This production was initially
promoted by public companies, which were the sole buyers of seed cotton and the sole
exporters of cotton lint
1. In the historical model, the cotton industry was characterized by
vertical co-ordination between farmers’ groups and cotton companies. This co-ordination took
the form of a contractual arrangement that went far beyond a forward contract specifying only
prices and quantities. Indeed, it could be interpreted as an implicit production contract with
mutual commitment (Glover, 1984, 1987; Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997). It was tacitly
renewable and resulted from insurance, credit and input market imperfections. On the one
hand, the public company generally supplied the farmer with credit and adequate inputs such
as seeds, pesticides, fertilizer, and technical assistance. Moreover, the production contract
included a short-term price insurance mechanism as cotton and input prices are set at the
beginning of the season. The company committed itself to buying all the harvest, whatever the
international price. On the other hand, the farmer pledged to deliver his harvest to the
company in order to reimburse the input credit. Although this organizational model has been
successful in promoting cotton production, some critics have been concerned about the low
level of farmer prices (Pursell and Diop, 1998). The poor incentive system was said to
contribute to allocative inefficiencies and to the persistence of poverty in rural areas.
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In the 90s, these criticisms led to structural reforms, in turn giving rise to a wide range
of market and institutional options. Most countries chose a combination of partial
privatization and market openness. Where public enterprises remained, the range of their
activities was modified considerably in order to reduce production costs and to improve
competitiveness. For instance, in Ghana, the reforms allowed free entry into the cotton sector.
In Benin, the public monopoly
2 was removed, but competition between ginners is still
strongly regulated by an inter-professional organization. In Côte d’Ivoire, the former cotton
production area of the CIDT has been divided into three zones.  Two of them have been
allocated to private firms while the third remains under the control of the CIDT. In Burkina
Faso, the cotton sector was under the control of a single company (SOFITEX)
3 until 2001.
However, the state now has a minority share in the company, management being in the hands
of a private operator under the close control of farmers’ unions.
Whatever the institutional evolution of the cotton sector, one thing seems crucial:
preserving the strong co-operation between farmers and ginning companies. Indeed, in the
absence of a reliable legal mechanism, market liberalization may  induce the collapse of
contractual agreements between farmers and firms. Consequently, in a context where market
failures still remain a major hindrance and the farmers’ welfare a major goal, it is important to
investigate the costs and benefits of different institutional arrangements.
 In the first section we discuss the expected advantages of the production contract. The
main idea of this section is to highlight the fact that in the African context, non-market co-
operation between farmers and traders outperforms market transactions. In the second section,
we show through the Ghanaian experience, that the main advantage of the historical model is
to prevent opportunistic behaviors when property rights are incomplete. In the third section,
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illustrated by the Malian case, we outline the cost of the monopolistic market structure. In the
following sections, we present alternatives to the full market competition option and to public
monopolistic organization. The fourth section addresses the case of Burkina Faso where some
efficiency gains resulted from the farmers’ participation in the cotton company. In the fifth
section, we analyze the potential benefits of horizontal unbundling through the Ivorian
experience. Finally, we draw the main conclusions.
2. PRODUCTION CONTRACT AS A RESPONSE TO TRANSCATION COSTS
In Africa, the high level of transaction costs prevents farmers from having access to
certain markets. These transaction costs are generated by the costliness of information.
Asymmetric information induces moral hazard and adverse selection on insurance, credit and
input markets. In this case, production contracts between farmers and a firm reduce the
market transaction costs associated with the identification of the agent, the monitoring of its
behavior and enforcement in the case of non-compliance with the contractual arrangement
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985).
First, the production contract allows partial compensation for the failure of the
insurance market. Indeed, the input and seed cotton prices are usually set at the beginning of
the season. Hence, the price risk is transferred to the firm, which can be considered as less
risk adverse and more able to manage it. This price guarantee promotes production and
improves farmers' welfare as it allows them to smooth their consumption (Newbery and
Stiglitz, 1981). It goes without saying that alternative individual strategies against risk are also
available when insurance or credit markets are lacking. The farmer can diversify his activities
inside or outside the agricultural sector to reduce income volatility (risk management). In
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addition, he can cope with the residual risk by setting up a precautionary savings fund (inter-
temporal consumption smoothing) or by sharing risk inside a mutual insurance group, e.g. an
ethnic or village community (inter-individual consumption smoothing) (Besley, 1995).
Whatever their interest, the aforementioned individual strategies are of course costly. Indeed,
diversification prevents the exploitation of comparative advantage. The cost of precautionary
saving is prohibitive for the farmers who are near the subsistence threshold and the savings do
not protect against repeated negative shocks. Moreover, the farmers only have access to
productive assets (cattle, food stocks …) which are an imperfect substitute for saving products
since their liquidation breaks into the future household income (Deaton, 1992). Finally,
mutual insurance schemes only protect against idiosyncratic risks, and social pressure may be
insufficient to prevent opportunistic behavior of the members (Jalan and Ravallion, 1999;
Ligon, 1998; Townsend, 1994).
Second, the production contract is a response to the input credit market failure. In sub-
Saharan countries, freehold property does not exist so credit cannot be secured by a mortgage
on land. Moreover, the farmer cannot pledge his future harvest as security to a formal or
informal credit institution because of the riskiness of the harvest value. Hence, the main
advantage of the production contract is its seasonal credit facility. On the one hand, a
production contract reduces the uncertainty of the future value of a harvest. It eliminates price
risk and reduces yield volatility by guaranteeing input access and technical advice. On the
other hand, in the countries where the banking system has collapsed, the cotton companies
have to substitute for the banks and provide input credit.
Third, the production contract is a response to the input market failure. In the cotton
sector, the quality of inputs (seeds, fertilizers, chemicals and technical advice…) is a crucial
factor for high yields and the quality of cotton lint. The main characteristic of the input market
is the informational asymmetry between the buyer and the seller regarding the quality of theCERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
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product leading to an adverse selection phenomenon (Akerlof, 1970). The willingness to pay
for products offered is weak, so only sellers of poor quality inputs offer them for sale.
Consequently, poor quality inputs will drive away the good ones and little trade will occur. A
potential solution is the implementation of legal standards, but this solution is not easy due to
the present weaknesses of African governments. In this case, the trading company alleviates
the absence of legal standards by a commitment to the quality of input supplied.
To sum up, thanks to seasonal credit, production contracts allow cotton farmers to
benefit from a steady provision of quality inputs. Moreover, the contractual commitment to a
trading company gives farmers access to services such as agricultural advice and to a price
insurance covering the whole harvest (Araujo Bonjean and Combes, 2001). The firm also
benefits from the contractual commitment through an increase in cotton yields, steady
deliveries, as well as a high quality product. This contract farming system can be seen as a
“win-win” arrangement for both sides.
3. THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PRODUCTION CONTRACT IN THE AFRICAN
COTTON SECTOR : THE  CASE OF GHANA
The production contract in the cotton sector is a co-operative solution that benefits
both farmers and ginning companies. However, in Africa, the main obstacle to the
implementation of such contracts is the failure of the legal framework, which allows
opportunistic behaviors. Farmers might not comply with their contractual obligations, nor
might they deliver the effective harvest or reimburse the input credit. Moral hazard is reduced
in a monopolistic market where the farmer’s outlet for seed cotton is unique, as is the case in a
large number of West African countries. Indeed, defaulting would prove costly as the farmer
would be excluded from the contractual relationship with the cotton company and
consequently would be confronted with the difficulty of pre-financing the cotton season.CERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
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In the case of a competitive market, the farmer can sell his product to a rival firm. The
question then arises as to whether the cost of defaulting is as high as in a monopolistic market.
From an analytical point of view, game theory suggests that in the context of repeated games
over an infinite period, the solution of a mutual commitment between farmers and firms
should emerge. Respect of the contract is an investment in a good reputation: the default can
be profitable in the short run but costly in the long run if the agent’s discount rate is not too
high. However, in Africa, experience shows that the farmers' discount rate is rather high,
especially for the poorest. Moreover, even in the favorable case where the agent’s discount
rate is not too high, the problem in repeated games is the multiplicity of equilibrium (Folk
theorem). Indeed, the self-enforcement conditions of the production contract also imply a
common belief in the effectiveness of the punishment mechanism (i.e. the non-renewal of the
contract in case of default). When this condition is not fulfilled, the co-operative solution of
the production contract cannot emerge in a competitive market.
In Ghana, the liberalization of the cotton sector dates back to 1986. The public ginning
company, the Cotton Development Board (CDB), was replaced by the Ghana Cotton
Company Limited. The GCCL is a major company, whose private shareholding was initially
70% but grew to 85 % in 1995. The market also opened to fully private firms and today, ten
companies are operating with three major ones: GCCL, PDL and Nulux. In this context,
farmers used to get input credit from one firm and deliver their harvest to another, thus
avoiding repaying their loan. Indeed, without any public regulation, the “free entry for all”
policy favored the emergence of small-scale traders (“purchase companies”) which do not
invest in downward activities and are not interested in providing input credit.
In comparison with these “purchase companies”, the ginning companies have a deeper
transformation process with higher fixed costs. Therefore, they have to supply credit in order
to secure a minimum provision of seed cotton without any guarantee about the effectiveCERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
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delivery. Confronted by a large scale cheating phenomenon, the ginning companies have to
lower the purchasing price of cotton, aggravating the problem of debt collection. In this
institutional environment, characterized by problems of enforcement, producer prices
remained quite low in relation to international prices and purchase prices in neighboring
countries (Table 2). After a sharp increase at the end of the eighties, following the
liberalization process, cotton production remains far below its potential. For instance, in Côte
d’Ivoire, a country with similar natural conditions, seed cotton production is more than ten
times that of Ghana (table 1). Production failed to develop because of a low input use and low
yields. The recent years experience shows that, despite the implementation of a zoning
agreement (see below) firms have failed to set up efficient rules to counter the cheats, leading
to the collapse of cotton production.
[INSERT TABLE 1 : Seed cotton production]
[INSERT TABLE 2 : Ratio of the producer price to the to international price of cotton
lint]
4. ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCIES AND AFRICAN COTTON PUBLIC
MONOPOLIES : THE CASE OF MALI
If the production contract is easier to promote in a public monopsony/monopoly
context, the potential cost of this market structure cannot be ignored. The loss of economic
efficiency and the distributional impact of this situation are well known.
First, for an exogenous international price, and as the result of the market power of the
purchasing firm, seed cotton is paid at a lower price than the price peasants would receive in
an environment of perfect competition. Second, mark up prices can result from the monopolyCERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
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position of the cotton company in the input market. Hence, a non-socially optimum
consumption of inputs may occur, resulting in a loss of production. To some extent, the
provision of inputs is subject to a lock-in effect resulting from the opportunistic behavior of
the processing firm (Williamson, 1975). The presence of such allocative inefficiencies has
been deeply analyzed since the publication of the World Bank 1981 Report on accelerated
development in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, until the early nineties, cotton production has
generally been promoted in the framework of public monopolies.
Beyond these allocative distortions, the public cotton companies have been criticized
for enhancing “X-inefficiency”. From the initial property rights theory (Demsetz, 1967) to the
recent microeconomic developments (Tirole, 1990), there is a large body of literature
indicating that most public enterprises suffer from a low level of productivity. They tend to
remain inside their production-possibility frontier, failing to derive as much output as they
could from the resources they employ (Leibenstein, 1966, 1989). With private ownership,
good technical efficiency normally underlies the profit goal and the long run condition for
company survival. In a public company, less attention is generally paid to this factor. The way
in which property rights are distributed and the soft budget constraint these organizations face
give rise to the Hicksian "quiet life".
Together with the property rights, a competitive market, as noted by Leibenstein
(1987), stimulates pressure from the "bottom" from buyers or users, and pressure from the
"top", from owners or their representatives. In public monopolies, these sources of stimulation
are quite weak, when they indeed exist. Agents have limited incentives to work at best end for
the whole community and the risk of a low level of effort is likely.CERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
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These criticisms on the way African public monopolies have been, and sometimes still
are, managed have found a concrete illustration in the recent financial problems of the
CMDT
4 in Mali.
The CMDT is a mixed company, with a majority state shareholding (60 % for the state
and 40 % for DAGRIS). CMDT benefits from a legal monopoly on seed cotton purchases and
provides farmers with inputs, credit and technical advice. Cotton production in Mali expanded
considerably since the sixties (table 1). With a production around 600 000 tons in 2001/02,
Mali is becoming the first African producer of cotton (appendix C). Nevertheless, this
significant performance did not prevent critics. At the beginning of the new millennium, the
Malian monopoly faced a severe financial crisis that was not only due to the dramatic fall in
international prices, 46% from August 1997 to December 1999. Dissatisfaction had grown up
among farmers who denounced the poor public management of the firm as a major source of
low farm gate prices.
One of the main criticisms that have been put forward, especially for the 1997-1999, is
the high and still increasing costs of processing units. Cotton transportation by the CMDT has
also proved to be particularly costly. Another grievance has been focused on the financial
terms of the investment program and on its consequences on the CMDT capacity to finance
cotton production. The situation was at its height in the 2000/2001 season when the CMDT
had to cut the producer price to reduce its huge deficit in a context where low international
prices made the budget constraint harder. This situation led the farmers to reduce their cotton
production significantly (tables 1 and 2). With a production of about half a normal year, the
crisis reached a climax. Several regional workshops and the national conference (e.g. états
généraux) of April 2001 followed these events, aiming at setting up a reform agenda. This
                                                
4 Compagnie Malienne de Développement des Textiles.CERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
12
agenda includes in the short run the implantation/entry of a new operator and in the medium
run, the privatization of the CMDT.
5. MONOPOLY AND FARMERS' PARTICIPATION : THE CASE OF BURKINA
FASO
A solution to reduce public monopoly inefficiencies while preserving vertical-co-
ordination in the cotton industries would be to strengthen the empowerment of farmers. To
some extent that is what Hirschman (1970) referred to as the  voice option. It is worth
examining the effective possibility of this strategy by considering the restructuring of the
Burkina cotton sector. Until the end of the nineties, the cotton sector was considered within
the framework of a public monopoly, integrating a wide range of activities from seed cotton
collection to cotton lint exportation. The institutional change that took place in 1999
contributed to the evolution of the organization towards a more private and a less integrated
one, while maintaining an implicit obligation for farmers to contract with SOFITEX.
SOFITEX is the historical leading sector-based organization. The Burkina State has
long been the main shareholder and supervisor, the supervision taking the form of various
regulations, including the determination of pan-territorial prices of seed cotton and cotton
inputs. In this institutional scheme, the capital of the society was held by the State (65%) and
the CFDT (Compagnie Française pour le Développement des fibres Textiles
5), the French
agribusiness company, (34%). The situation evolved with a significant public divestiture. In
1999, the property rights over SOFITEX were redistributed in a way which allowed the active
participation of farmers (accord inter-professionnel). With the redefinition of the ownership
structure, the interests of the State were reduced to 35% in favor of collective organizations of
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producers (30%), UNPCB (Union Nationale des Producteurs de Coton Burkinabè) being the
national grouping of these entities. DAGRIS, the third partner, maintained its 34%
participation and retained the operational management.
  With this new capital structure, farmers are now in a better position to supervise the
management of SOFITEX. They have the opportunity to stimulate the reduction of
managerial slack, to prevent inefficiencies and to initiate external audits aiming at controlling
the management. For example, in 1997, the auditing procedure proved to be useful in
revealing excessive transportation costs. A key element of the reform has been the
constitution of cotton farmers unions (GPC) which substituted for the former village groups
(groupements villageois). The national hierarchy of the professional organization (UNPCB)
and its sub-regional representations co-ordinate GPC action. This farmer's organization
reduces the cost of collective action and strengthens the farmers' voice.
Thanks to this professional organization, the cotton producers are also improving their
knowledge of international prices. This information can be seen as a prerequisite for appraisal
of the price they should ask. Moreover, farmers can refer to sub-regional markets as
benchmark markets before requesting price revisions. During the last season (2001/2002), the
producer price was at its highest level whereas the international prices were at their lowest
since the mid eighties (Table 2). Today, not only is the price of seed cotton the most
remunerative of the West African region, but it also preserves the sustainability of the
financial situation of SOFITEX. On the contrary, in another institutional context, the ginning
companies of Côte d’Ivoire and Benin show a deficit that is financed by the State (Goreux and
Macrae, 2002).
SOFITEX sells inputs on credit to the GPC that is repaid by deducting the input cost
from the seed cotton price. The members of the GPC are collectively responsible for the
refunding. Peer monitoring within the group helps to reduce farmers’ moral hazard.CERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
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Moreover, the monopsony position of SOFITEX allows a credible threat of non-renewal of
the credit supply to be exerted on the defaulting GPC. The reform is partly successful as the
new GPC inherited a huge debt from the former GV. Nevertheless, a reduction in the arrears
can be observed over the last two seasons.
6.  ZONING AND LOCAL YARDSTICK COMPETITION : THE CASE OF COTE
D’IVOIRE
As shown by the Burkina Faso experience, farmers' participation in decision-making
can be successful in a monopoly context. However, such participation can also be thought of
in an indirect competitive market structure. In the theoretical framework of market
contestability, the efficiency of a market is not directly determined by effective competition.
Following Baumol and Lee (1991), perfect contestability provides a standard for the
competitive market where entry and exit are free. As the mere threat of entry is presumed to
be sufficient to enforce good conduct by the incumbent, the best strategy should be to create
the conditions for the monopoly to be constantly disputable by means of potential entry.
It has been suggested above that durable vertical co-ordination between farmers and a
cotton company is easier to promote in the context of a unique buyer. Therefore, this
institutional structure conflicts with the principle of perfect contestability as the entry
mechanism is restricted. Nevertheless, the benefits of contestability can be approximated
through indirect competition that requires the intervention of a regulatory body. The regulator
has a crucial role to play in defining the missions of the firm and enforcing the schedule of
conditions. In addition, the regulator has the opportunity to guarantee some of the properties
of market contestability, for example, through the concession-awarding system. In this model,
competition is not on, but for the market and takes the form of periodically repeated auctions
for the monopoly (Demsetz, 1967). The threat of breaking or non-renewal of the concessionCERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
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should prevent opportunistic behaviors. If this sanction is not credible, the private firm would
be in a similar situation to that of the public monopoly with contract planning.
The feasibility of the concession-awarding system will depend on several factors.
First, one may call attention to the difficulty in specifying the economic and social obligations
of the operator and of financing these missions. Second, the informational asymmetries
between potential operators, or between these operators and the regulator, are sources of
adverse selection and moral hazard. This is especially important when the concession-
awarding has to be renewed. Specific assets of the incumbent that result from past activity
have the dimension of a sunk cost for potential rivals who intend to enter the market. Third,
the term of the concession is also a significant parameter: a short-term concession promotes
perfect contestability but discourages long-term investment. In spite of these practical
constraints, the concession-awarding system brings a non-negligible contribution to the level
of market contestability and may be preserved to favor long-run mutual interest.
Awarding concessions can be conceived within the framework of a horizontal
unbundling by geographical monopoly units. The sharing of the national territory, which is
currently labeled the zoning strategy, has been introduced in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Its
main expected advantage is to allow indirect competition through benchmarking. This
“yardstick” competition procedure is commonly used for regulatory purposes to extract
monetary or slack rent from public utilities where the monopoly situation has a technological
legitimacy (Littlechild, 1986; Schleifer, 1985). Indeed, in the cotton sector, regional units can
be brought into competition by the regulatory mechanism. Moreover, in a zoning system
where firms are more likely to be private, the state can retain a minority stake in some of them
to strengthen the supervision. The status of the shareholder normally gives the state a better
knowledge of the cost structure, and might put it in a position to counter any collusion
between cotton firms.CERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
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The relevance of the comparison between firms is conditioned by several restrictions.
First, the product must be homogenous or sufficiently so, but cotton seed seems to respect this
constraint. Second, units must operate in the same cost conditions for the comparison of
regional monopolies to make sense. In the cotton sector such a situation is unlikely. For
example in Burkina Faso, the chance for the “fringe competition” to be successful seems to be
low. The private firm entering the market will have to operate in a region (East and Central
zones) where the public infrastructure is poor and the seed cotton production is more risky
than elsewhere. Third, if cost conditions differ over the whole territory, all organizations will
have to be put in a virtually identical operating environment. Consequently, for the valuation
of the management to be as pure as possible, all relevant exogenous factors have to be
considered. Fourth, we have to assume that regional units do not collude, requiring at least
different private shareholders. Fifth, the geographical divisions must be respected, which
means that the regulatory authority must be endowed with sufficient coercive powers, namely
for enforcing compliance with the specifications about the collection area. The regulatory
authority has an important role in monitoring and exacting punishment. Its should include
state representatives, farmers and other professionals from the sector, and be protected against
political pressure.
Two zoning experiences have been implemented in West Africa. In Ghana, a zoning
agreement was concluded between the different cotton companies in 1999, as an answer to the
generalized cheating that stemmed from overall disruption of the free market system.
However, public authorities have handled the zoning very badly. Indeed, there was no
consensus among actors in the definition of the cotton areas. The candidates for entry to the
market were not selected on a transparent basis. There was no tender-bid to control entry and
no investigation of their financial quality. In addition, the companies were unable to obtain
any guarantee about the effectiveness of their collection area. The entering firms were givenCERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
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new zones cutting into those already established. The Ghanaian experience is a good
illustration of the difficulty of setting up an efficient institutional option such as zoning in a
context of a poor regulatory body proceeding from a weak State.
In the Ivorian case, the CIDT (Compagnie Ivoirienne de Développement des Textiles)
has been broken down into three units, each one being in a monopoly situation over its
regional area. Two new operators entered the market. IPS-Paul Reinhardt and Aiglon groups,
were respectively assigned the northwest (Ivoire Coton, is a subsidiary of IPS-Paul Reinhardt)
and the northeast region (LCCI, a subsidiary of Aiglon). The new CIDT is undergoing
privatization and the farmers might be the main shareholders with a participation of about 80
%. The central region was assigned to this third firm. Although the market has been allocated
in accordance with the bidding mechanism, the two private firms proved to be heterogeneous
in their financial quality. Indeed, the former has accumulated arrears against the farmers over
the last two seasons while the latter not only paid in due time but also extended the economic
and social missions implemented by the former public CIDT.
In this institutional system, a pan-territorial seed cotton price is negotiated by private
actors and ratified by the public authority. The yardstick competition principle should then
work through the unit cost of the cotton seed. The firm, which is unable to pay the pan-
territorial regulated price, reveals its low profitability and might leave the market. However,
in the Ivorian case, the financial situation of one firm makes it unable to pay the producers in
due time and the state failed to regulate the market. To answer this problem, some observers
have suggested increasing the degree of market liberalization by promoting a competitive
environment among ginning companies. In this perspective, zoning should disappear as well
as the regulated price. By following this strategy, it is worth noting that the Ivorian solution
would represent a move from the zoning system to the market option while the GhanaianCERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
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experience goes the opposite way, zoning being supposed to be a practical answer to market
failures.
The yardstick competition between local monopolies is a normative option that
theoretically combines both the incentives of the market and the stability of the production
contract. However, the experiences of the two aforementioned countries suggest the necessity
for a strong regulatory body. Indeed, the lack of credibility of the public institutions proved to
be a major source of failure. In Côte d’Ivoire, the late payments of cotton farmers have not
been punished and in Ghana the zoning agreement proved to be very difficult to respect. The
outcome of the alternative solution of free market competition is itself uncertain where the
state is unable to enforce the mutual commitments.
7. CONCLUSION
 West African countries have already accumulated considerable experience of the
various possibilities of restructuring their cotton sectors. Although some are pursuing
structural reforms within the framework of a public monopoly, as Mali is in this case, others
have given preference to the private option with varying degrees of market competition. In all
cases, the weakness of the state is a major hindrance that does not allow the opportunistic
behavior of agents, whose discount rate is high, to be thwarted.
Most experiences demonstrate the necessity to strengthen the role of farmers through
groups and professional organizations. It can be done through a partial acquisition of the
ginning company’s shares by producers’ associations. In 1999, Burkina Faso followed this
option with some success. A reduction in free-riding phenomena has been progressively
observed, especially by means of a higher rate of input credit reimbursement as a result of
farmers’ financial participation in the cotton company. This behavior can be analyzed as the
result of the lengthening of the temporal horizon that accompanies the collective organizationCERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
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of cotton producers. Indeed, farmers’ groups are more sensitive to the reputation effect and
more willing to invest in the building of a social capital. Collective action through groups
tends to overcome both the short-sightedness of agents whose rationality is bounded and the
failures of public institutions.
In the long run, the competitive market equilibrium is Pareto optimal. However,
transition costs cannot be ignored. Indeed, in the transitional period, the main problem is to
promote production in a context where mutual confidence does not emerge spontaneously. In
this phase, the production contract has to be preserved against opportunistic behaviors that
can result from firms as well as peasants.
We have seen that one typical case of moral hazard is generalized “ cheating”. The
input credit is unpaid while there are no easy retaliatory measures on the part of the firm. In
this case, the monopoly structure can be seen as a preferred option if peasants’ power is strong
enough. This power can proceed from farmers' organizational structures or shareholding in
the ginning company. One alternative way could be the zoning system that promotes indirect
competition between well-defined geographical areas. However, this institutional option does
not significantly reduce the need for public regulations and its feasibility is problematic in the
West African context of weak states. Therefore, while the final normative solution is known,
the wide range of present institutional experiences will reveal the best practical way to reach
this outcome.CERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
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Table 1 : Seed cotton production (1000 tons)
60-61 70-71 80-81 90-91 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02
Mali 6 53 108 276 406 453 523 518 460 240 575
Burkina 3 23 63 190 151 214 338 284 254 276 375
Côte d'Ivoire 4 29 137 261 217 265 337 361 395 287 383
Ghana 0 7 13 18 25 34 38 36 35 14
Source : DAGRIS
Table 2 : Ratio of the producer price to the to international price of cotton lint (Cotlook
A indice)
Country 1994-951995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-012001-02
Burkina Faso 0,30 0,40 0,52 0,46 0,57 0,67 0,48 0,68
Cote d'Ivoire 0,43 0,41 0,52 0,53 0,62 0,67 0,61 0,64
Mali 0,34 0,38 0,45 0,44 0,57 0,55 0,45 0,68
Ghana 0,13 0,15 0,42 0,41 0,61 0,45 0,26 0,55
Cotlook A indice (cts/lb) 80 98 81 79 66 53 59 48
Calculated for a common ginning ratio of 42 %
Source : DAGRIS, Goreux and MacCrae (2002),  IFSCERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
24
Appendix A : Exports  of cotton lint  (2001-2002) (1000 tons)
Exports % exports Exports % exports
1 United States 1 960 32 11 Turkmenistan 120 2
2 Francophone Africa 890 15 12 Pakistan 98 2
3 Uzbekistan 729 12 13 Egypt 98 2
4 Australia 697 11 14 Tajikistan 93 2
5 Greece 250 4 15 China 87 1
6 Syria 229 4 16 Zimbabwe 87 1
7 Mali 201 3 17 Kazakhstan 87 1
8 Burkina Faso 142 2 18 Brazil 76 1
9 Cote d’Ivoire 136 2 19 Cameroon 76 1
10 Benin 125 2 20 Paraguay 76 1
Source : ICAC and DAGRIS
Appendix B : Main producing countries of cotton lint  (2001-2002) (1000 tons)
Production % production Production % production
1 China 5 008 24 11 Syria 348 2
2 United States 4 370 21 12 Egypt 250 1
3 India 2 722 13 13 Mali 239 1
4 Pakistan 1 807 9 14 Turkmenistan 196 1
5 Uzbekistan 1 023 5 15 Cote d’Ivoire 163 1
6 Francophone Africa 946 5 16 Burkina Faso 152 1
7 Turquie 849 4 17 Benin 136 1
8 Brazil 718 3 18 Zimbabwe 131 1
9 Australia 675 3 19 Tajikistan 120 1
10 Greece 414 2 20 Argentina 120 1
Other countries 651 3 Total 20 918 100
Source : ICAC and DAGRISCERDI, Etudes et Documents 2003.03
25
Appendix C : Cotton lint production in Africa (1990-2000)
Rang Pays Production of cotton lint
(1000 tons)
% of African production
1 Egypt 229 15
2 Mali 170 11
3 Benin 150 10
4 Côte d’Ivoire 140 9
5 Zimbabwe 128 9
6 Burkina Faso 115 8
7 Chad 76 5
8 Cameroon 75 5
9 Sudan 62 4
10 Togo 58 4
11 Nigeria 50 3
12 Tanzania 36 2
13 South Africa 33 2
14 Zambia 27 2
15 Mozambique 22 1
16 Uganda 22 1
17 Madagascar 17 1
18 Ghana 17 1
19 Ethiopia 15 1
20 Guinea 11 1
Others African countries 47 3
Source : ICAC and DAGRIS